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ABSTRACT 
In the literature on asymmetric warfare, a great deal of disagreement and 
contradictory theories have arisen concerning factors affecting the outcomes of war. In an 
attempt to resolve the discrepancies among these theories, this thesis surveys why there is 
no single theory that adequately explains which factors affect the outcomes of asymmetric 
wars. Using logistic regression models and statistical analysis for asymmetric conflicts 
occurring between 1945 and 2015, the thesis explores the effects of three independent 
variables: the number of actors offering external support to the non-state actor, the duration 
of the conflict, the regime type of the strong actor; and two control variables: gross 
domestic product and population, on the result of the conflicts. The thesis concludes that 
the number of external supporters to the non-state actor increases their probability of 
winning; that the increasing duration of the conflict also increases their probability of 
winning; that the probability of the democratic strong actor winning the conflict will 
decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor; and that democratic strong 
actors have a higher probability of winning against weak actors than do non-democratic 
actors in asymmetric wars. The approach presented in the thesis provides a new perspective 
to analyze factors that affect the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts, which may lead to a 
better general understanding of the outcomes of wars. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Global conflicts today increasingly fall into the category of small asymmetric 
conflicts, or small wars. Since 1946, 236 conflicts have been recorded by Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program Department of Peace and Conflict Research (UCDP).1 From these 236 
conflicts, 45 were conflicts between state actors (19 percent), and 191 were conflicts 
between state actors and non-state actors (81 percent).2 Small wars have distinctive 
characteristics; according to Gil Merom, small wars are associated with acute military 
asymmetry—insurgents that use guerrilla warfare and an incumbent, which Merom defines 
as an “indigenous government that fights on its own or with external participation, or a 
foreign power that imposes itself on the population,”3 that uses ground forces for 
counterinsurgency warfare.4 Furthermore, according to Andrew Mack, “the relationship 
between the belligerents is asymmetric,”5 particularly when the strong actor poses the 
threat of occupation and invasion, and insurgents forces do not have those capabilities.6  
For the purpose of having common understanding about the terms used in our 
theses, we provide the following definitions. According to UCDP, the state is “an 
internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an 
internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose 
sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government 
previously controlling the same territory.”7 A government is “the party controlling the 
                                                 
1 “Number of Conflicts, 1975–2016,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research, http://ucdp.uu.se/. 
2 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. 
3 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in 
Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 4. 
4 Merom, 4. 
5 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 181. 
6 Mack, 181. 
7 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Number of Conflicts, 
1975–2016.” 
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capital of a state.”8 Throughout this thesis, we will consider the government, strong actors, 
and incumbents as the same as state actors. A non-state actor is “any non-governmental 
group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to 
influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility.”9 We will consider rebels, weak actors, 
and insurgents the same as non-state actors.  
Merom notes that, “in the twentieth century, and particularly after 1945, [non-state 
actors] seem to have done rather well in small wars, particularly when their enemies were 
democratic.”10 Some scholars like Merom, Desch, Reiter, and Stam attribute the outcome 
of strong democratic actors in small wars to the relation between their society, politicians, 
and government.11 Others like Arreguín-Toft and Mack argue that democracy itself is not 
the cause of failure, but rather the inadequate military doctrine democracies have developed 
(in other words, because of bad strategy).12 
This disagreement among scholars reveals that there is not a single theory that 
explains the outcomes of asymmetric wars; therefore, to make inroads into answering this 
question, we undertake to test whether specific factors can forecast the outcome in 
asymmetric conflict. Our believe is that there are factors that can forecast or explain the 
outcome in asymmetric war, which will lead to a better understanding of the outcome of 
war between a strong actor (the government) and a weak actor (the non-state actor) in future 
                                                 
8 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. 
9 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. 
10 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 4. In a footnote to this passage, Merom explains, 
“Global fluctuation in territory acquisition and loss and the demise of European colonialism and 
imperialism seem also to support this temporal contention. See David Strang, “Global Patterns of 
Decolonization, 1500–1987,” International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991), 429–54, particularly p.435, figure 
I. For data on the changing number of independent political units, see also Charles Tilly, The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975),23; William Eckhardt, 
Civilizations, Empires and Wars: A Quantitative History of War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 
1992), 147. While the proliferation of independent states was not caused by one factor, it is worthwhile to 
recall that Western states were the most powerful actors during this period of proliferation.” 
11Merom; Michael C. Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic 
Triumphalism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, 
Democracies at War (Princeton University Press, 2002). 
12Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars.” 
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conflicts. The range of asymmetric war theories raises the following question: which 
factors allow non-state actors to win against state actors in an asymmetric war?  
Because of different factors and the unique behavioral modality of each conflict, 
this research effort developed a model that uses historical data to determine which factors 
are significant in explaining the outcomes of wars. Using information from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program Department of Peace and Conflict Research (UCDP), World Bank 
dataset, and Polity IV dataset, we applied a logistic regression to examine a series of 
variables that affected the outcomes a set of conflicts between 1945 and the current day. 
Based on the system-level and statistical analysis results of the three independent variables 
(per year of the conflict)—the number of actors offering external support to the non-state 
actor; the duration of the conflict; the regime type of the strong actor (democracy or not)—
and two control variables (per year of the conflict)—GDP (gross domestic product) of the 
country; and the population number of the country—we found that, first, as the number of 
external actors supporting non-state actors increases, the likelihood that strong actors 
(governments) will win conflicts will decrease; second, as the duration of the conflict 
grows longer, the probability of the strong actor winning the war will decrease; third, the 
substantively and statistically significant interaction between conflict duration and 
democracy of the strong actor proves that, as conflict duration increases, the likelihood of 
a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-
democratic strong actor; and, fourth, even if the conflict duration increases, the probability 
of democratic strong actors winning in asymmetric war is higher than the probability of 
non-democratic strong actors winning. 
In order to answer our research question—which factors explain why weak non-
state actors win against state actors in an asymmetric war—we will test the following 
hypotheses:  
 As the number of actors providing external support to the non-state actor 
increases, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will 
decrease. 
4 
 As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong actor 
winning the war will decrease.  
 The likelihood that a democratic strong actor will win the conflict will 
decrease faster than that of a non-democratic strong actor. 
 Even if the conflict duration increases, democratic strong actors have a higher 
probability of winning asymmetric wars than non-democratic strong actors. 
In this thesis, we will proceed as follows: Chapter II lays out how scholars see the 
implications of each of the independent factors in explaining the outcome of a war; in a 
separate section, we will discuss and analyze each of these independent variables. Chapter 
III will examine our four hypotheses related to the independent and control variables. Next, 
to test these hypotheses, we apply a series of regression models, and we present the results. 
Chapter IV will examine three case studies that support our findings. In the final chapter, 
we offer conclusions. 
  
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Asymmetric conflicts are those waged between insurgents (non-state actors) and 
incumbents (state actor). In this chapter, we will examine the prevailing theories 
concerning which factors appear to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts.  
Classic realist theory sees international relations through the spectrum of relative 
power: as Thucydides describes the war between Athens and Sparta, “The strong do what 
they can and the weak suffer what they must.”13 Indeed, the association between power 
and conflict outcomes has long been the essence of realist international relations theory. 
As Kenneth Waltz presented, “In the absence of a supreme authority there is then the 
constant possibility that conflicts will be solved by force.”14 According to his theory, more 
power means more winning; less power means more losing. Defeat or failure in war leads 
to slavery or even death. Power, say realists, is not the only thing that explains who wins 
or loses the war—many other things can change the outcome of a war, ranging from 
strategy, technology, leadership, and even heroism—but power is useful, and it matters 
most.15 When the difference in ratio of relative power is very large, Arreguín-Toft argues, 
if these assertions that power entails winning in war, then weak actors probably would 
never prevail against stronger actors.16  
Yet the outcomes of many asymmetric wars show that weak actors sometimes do 
win.17 According to Arreguín-Toft, the percentage of the strong winning in asymmetric 
conflicts was 88.2 percent from 1800 until 1849; between 1850 and 1899 this percentage 
slightly dropped to 79.5 percent; Between 1900 and 1949, the number began to fall 
significantly to 65.1 percent; and in the period between 1950 and 1999, the percentage of 
                                                 
13 Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War 
(New York: Free Press, 1996), 352. 
14 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959), 188. 
15 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 2. 
16 Arreguín-Toft, 2. 
17 Arreguín-Toft, 3–5. 
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the strong winning in asymmetric conflicts was only 48.8 percent.18 For realist theorists, 
who emphasize the idea that the main difference between actors is power and who define 
the referee in international conflict as the one who has the ultimate military power, such 
victory of weak actors is hardly conceivable.19 In his book, Merom explains that, some 
realists “attribute the failure of strong powers in small wars to various malfunctions in the 
process of converting superior resources into effective military preponderance.”20 In 
addition, he adds, other realists argue that weak actors win because of motivation—that the 
balance of will and interest favors them because they are willing to sacrifice more.21 For 
Merom, the balance of power and the underdog’s (non-state actors) motivation is essential 
in making strong actors lose wars, but he argues that the roles of these factors are 
secondary. Rather, he believes that “democracies are constraint by their fear that a radical 
departure from accepted standards of behavior in war … will cost them dearly in their 
relations with other democracies.”22 Merom further notes that, “the greater is the intensity, 
the greater are the chances the battles will be brutal and more lives will be lost by both 
parties.”23 The society of strong democratic states cannot tolerate the brutality and the 
casualties of the conflict, making the wishes of the society the most important determinant 
of the outcome of small wars.24 Likewise, Andrew Mack warns governments who become 
committed to asymmetric wars against weak actors about conflict duration, saying that 
“they have to realize that over time the cost of the war will inevitably generate widespread 
opposition at home.”25 Mack argues that in every asymmetric war where the strong actor 
has been forced to withdraw from the conflict, it has been as a consequence of internal 
political and social disagreement.26 Arreguín-Toft disagrees with Andrew Mack on key 
                                                 
18 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 4. 
19 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 5. 
20 Merom, 7. 
21 Merom, 11.  
22 Merom, 25. 
23 Merom, 26. 
24 Merom, 26. 
25 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 200.  
26 Mack, 200.  
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points, however, and criticizes two arguments that he describes as decisive in his book Why 
Big Nations Lose Small Wars. The first argument that he criticizes is that the survival and 
interest of the strong actors is not at stake, leading their willingness to sustain cost low. 
Likewise, Arreguín-Toft rejects the argument that democratic strong actors lose 
asymmetric wars because they are too sensitive to casualties and too vulnerable to domestic 
criticism, whereas non-democratic strong actors are more likely to win because they are 
more ruthless and are isolated from their people’s criticism; instead, Arreguín-Toft states 
that it is the different strategy used by weak actors that makes them win the war, not the 
regime type of the strong actor (the government) or the external support for the weak one 
(non-state actor).27  
A. REGIME TYPE 
One of the most important developments in world politics in the last fifteen years 
has been the spread of democracy around the world. According to data assembled by 
political scientist Samuel Huntington, less than 20 percent of the states of the world were 
democratic in 1942, whereas almost half of the states of the world were democratic by 
1990.28 The attention of scholars then moved from the spread of democracy to the 
consequences of these expansions. The first demonstration of this shift was the debate over 
what has become known as the “democratic peace.”29 In his system for “Perpetual Peace,” 
Immanuel Kant claims that the internal organization of states has a crucial influence on a 
state’s external behavior toward other states; moreover, he says that democratic 
governments are less likely to go to war and are more apt to maintain peace than 
authoritarian ones.30 Political scientist Michael Doyle adopted Kant’s argument based on 
                                                 
27 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 204.  
28 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 26. 
29 Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness, 2. 
30 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), xvi. 
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a survey of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century wars: he concluded that democratic and 
liberal regimes were very unlikely to fight against each other.31  
Scholars have attempted to find a relationship between democratic government and 
military effectiveness and view the regime type of states as a feasible predictor of outcome 
in conflicts. While some argue that democratic states are more likely to lose than non-
democratic states in a long asymmetric war, others reject the idea that a relation exists 
between regime type and conflict outcome. According to Desch, Thucydides’ explanations 
of why democratic Athens failed in its fight with authoritarian Sparta in the Peloponnesian 
War is the typical indictment of democracy’s inefficiency at fighting wars.32 Some scholars 
argue that authoritarian states fight wars better than democratic states and that democratic 
states are less flexible than authoritarian states. Because democracies are ruled by emotion 
rather than reason, these scholars claim, their governments tend to behave irrationally and 
inconsistently. Furthermore, the election cycles in democratic states makes their 
governments have shorter time horizons due to the pressures of their electors. The softness 
and uncertainty of democracies makes democracies vulnerable to defeat. Authoritarian 
regimes, by contrast, hide the truth and sustain strict control over public information 
regarding wars they are fighting. Citizens in authoritarian states are often punished by 
extreme sanctions, such as imprisonment, torture, or even death if they try to oppose the 
wars their authoritarian regime conducts.  
To explain these differences, Arreguín-Toft describes four important implications 
of regime type for warfighting effectiveness: First, because they control the public’s feeling 
regarding a war’s legitimacy, authoritarian states are able to mobilize resources effectively 
and more rapidly than democratic ones. Second, by threatening to execute its citizens, 
authoritarian regimes can coerce their troops to fight more than democratic regimes. Third, 
authoritarian soldiers can commit barbarism against their enemies and are not restrained 
from committing acts of war upon noncombatants, such as civilians or prisoners of war. 
Finally, authoritarian regimes may sustain higher combat casualties and longer conflict 
                                                 
31 Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness, 2. 
32 Desch,12. 
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duration than can democratic regimes.33 In addition, Gil Merom argues that strong 
democratic actors often lose in asymmetric wars against weak actors: 
My argument is that democracies fail in small wars because they find it 
extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that 
which can serve victory. They are restricted by their domestic structure, and 
in particular by the creed of some of their most articulate citizens and the 
opportunities their institutional makeup presents such citizens. Other states 
are not prone to lose small wars, and when they do fail in such wars it is 
mostly for realist reasons.34 
Merom adds that, “Essentially, what prevents modern democracies from winning 
small wars is disagreement between state and society over expedient and moral issues that 
concern human life and dignity.”35 Arreguín-Toft affirms Merom’s claim that strong 
democratic actors lose in small wars, arguing that there is a special relationship between 
states and their society that makes strong democratic actors too squeamish to win small 
wars.36 
On the other hand, Desch, Reiter, and Stam conclude that democratic governments 
are better equipped to triumph in armed conflict than non-representative and non-
democratic governments. Political scientist Michael C. Desch terms this idea “democratic 
triumphalism.”37 Moreover, according to Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, two arguments 
explain why democratic states are more likely to win wars: The first argument is that 
democratic states are essentially more effective at fighting wars because it is easier for 
them to assemble their societies behind a war struggle (the so called “war fighting 
explanation”); the second is that democracies win wars because they are more careful and 
selective about deciding when to conduct war (“selection effect explanation”).38 According 
to Reiter and Stam, “democracies win wars because of the offshoots of public consent and 
                                                 
33 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 8–10. 
34 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 15. 
35 Merom, 19. 
36 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 16. 
37 Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness, 13. 
38 Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” The American Political 
Science Review 92, no. 2 (June 1, 1998), 377 https://doi.org/10.2307/2585670  
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leaders’ accountability to the voters.”39 In order to not be removed from office, leaders in 
democratic states cannot act against the consent of their voters. This consent, Reiter and 
Stam contend, offers democratic actors many advantages that enable them to prevail in 
war.40 Reiter and Stam further argue that democratic states are more likely to have higher 
organizational military efficiency and encourage superior individual soldiering; in other 
words, democratic states fight with better initiative, better logistics, and superior 
leadership.41 Other scholars argue that democracies win wars because they fight on the 
battlefield with much higher military effectiveness than their opponents. According to 
Michael Brown, democracies win wars because they have the ability to elect to fight wars 
that they are able to win and because they can mobilize more resources, make better 
decisions, and assemble public support for their military campaigns. David Lake claims 
that even though democratic states rarely fight wars against each other, they are likely 
succeed in wars.42 In addition, because democracies are compelled by their societies and 
enjoy greater societal policy support, democracies will assign more absolute resources to 
security and are more likely to win wars.43  
B. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
A second important factor with respect to the outcomes of asymmetric wars is the 
external support for weak actors. Jeffry Record has highlighted the relation between 
international intervention and the outcome of wars.44 One important factor in asymmetric 
conflict is external support to the non-state actors: many types of external support to the 
non-state actors can influence their fighting capacity. Some scholars argue that, even 
though this support is crucial, it will not alter the outcome of the conflict; other scholars 
                                                 
39 Reiter and Stam. Democracies at War, 12. 
40 Reiter and Stam, 12. 
41 Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, “Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (June 1, 1998), 266 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002798042003003  
42 David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” The American Political Science 
Review 86, no. 1 (March 1, 1992), 24. https://doi.org/10.2307/1964013 
43 Lake, 24. 
44 Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 
2007), 23–66. 
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demonstrate that non-state actors who receive highly fungible external support (weapons, 
money) are less likely to see conflict termination than non-state actors who do not benefit 
from this support. Strong actors rarely receive external support, whereas weak actors often 
attract some support.45 Arreguín-Toft argues that even if external support matters, weak 
actors are more likely to win if they use a different strategy from their opponents. In other 
words, the strategy used by weak actors is more important than the effect of any external 
support they can receive.46  
By contrast, a defender of the importance of external support, Jeffrey Record, in his 
study of external support for weak actors, identifies external support as a critical 
component of successful insurgencies, and strength is in demonstrating that, in many cases, 
external support matters. Record argues that victories by weaker actors in asymmetric war 
depend a great deal on external support from third parties. He concludes that insurgent 
success correlates more with external support than with any other explanation.47 In 
addition, he contradicts Arreguín-Toft and Merom by saying that “the weaker side’s 
possession of superior will and strategy is hardly a guarantee of success.”48 Even though 
Record recognizes the fact that isolating external support from stronger will and group 
strategies is difficult, he emphasizes that weak actors with a stronger will might look for 
external support; on the other hand, external support might encourage weak actors so that 
they develop a much stronger will.49  
Other scholars have focused on the relationship between external support and 
conflict duration. A journal article by Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew Enterline 
calculates the impact that external support has on the duration of intrastate conflicts; they 
concluded that external support generally increases conflict duration.50 Paul Collier, Anke 
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Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom agree on the importance of external support but, contrary to 
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, argue that external support can reduce conflict duration: in 
their statistical research on conflict duration, they found that external support to non-state 
actors decreased the conflict duration.51 
C. CONFLICT DURATION 
Theories of how asymmetric wars end hold that conflict duration and war outcome 
are firmly related. Scholars have tried to find the relationship between governments and 
insurgent groups that explains conflict duration and termination. Once a conflict is started, 
violence and conflict will endure until actors agree to negotiate a settlement or until one 
side is defeated. Arreguín-Toft recognizes the effect of conflict duration, arguing that 
“weak actors tend to win protracted war.”52 He also argues that if the weak actors use a 
different strategy from strong actors, this approach will extend the duration of conflict and 
help the weak to win protracted wars. Other scholars have likewise studied conflict 
duration and its relation to outcomes, as well as which factors explain the variations in 
conflict duration. Conflict duration has been linked to a variety of factors: Cunningham 
finds it to be a function of the amount of non-state organizations and the balance of military 
capabilities between states and non-state actors—the strength of the conflict as well as the 
capacity of the actors to control territory.53 Balch-Lindsay and Enterline offer a different 
explanation, relating conflict duration to the weakness of the state.54 Fearon, in his article 
“Sons of the Soil,” finds a relation between conflict duration and the type of conflicts 
between natives and migrants.55 In their article “Killing Time,” Dylan Balch-Lindsay and 
Andrew Enterline make different hypotheses on what affects conflict duration, identifying 
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fourteen factors that potentially affect conflict duration. They do not, however, establish 
any relationship between conflict duration and outcome of the conflict.56 
D. CONCLUSION 
The discrepancies and disagreements among these asymmetric war theories raises 
the following question: which factors allow weak non-state actors to win against strong 
actors in an asymmetric war? Based on this literature review, we argue that three factors—
the number of actors offering external supports to the non-state actor; the duration of the 
conflict; the regime type of the strong actor (democracy or not)—affect the outcome of 
asymmetric wars. In the next chapter, we introduce a model that uses historical data in 
order to test the relevance of these factors in explaining the outcomes of wars.  
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III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to understand how each of the independent variables relate to the outcome 
of a war, we introduce a system-level analysis; then we examine four hypotheses related to 
the independent and control variables. We apply several statistical regression models to 
test these hypotheses using the three independent variables—the number of actors offering 
external supports to the non-state actor each year of the conflict; the duration of the conflict; 
the regime type of the strong actor (democracy or not) per year—and two control 
variables—GDP (gross domestic product) of the country per year; and the population 
number of the country each year. We chose these two controlled variables in order to show 
that the result of our model is not driven by the wealth (GDP) or the population size of the 
state.  
According to Mao Zedong, “The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and 
destroy the enemy.”57 Four hypotheses summarize our assumptions about the relationship 
between these independent variables and the dependent variable of conflict outcome. In 
order to determine if the number of external supporters play a decisive role in the outcome 
of asymmetric war, we decided to test the relevance of the number of supporters in 
correlation with the outcome of the conflict. Furthermore, we decided to test if the 
increasing number of supporters will decrease the likelihood that the stronger actor wins 
the conflict. Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: As the number of actors providing external support to the non-state 
actor increases, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease. 
The history of conflicts in the last fifty years has shown, most of the conflicts 
resulting in the success of the weaker actors have taken too much time to finish, as in the 
French-Algerian war, the Vietnam War, or the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan. On the 
other hand, other conflicts with shorter duration have led to the stronger actors winning the 
conflict. Nevertheless, there is disagreement between scholars regarding conflict duration 
                                                 
57 Mao Tse-Tung and Samuel B. Griffith, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Dover Publications, 
2005), 20.  
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and the outcome of asymmetric war, and because we sometimes see in history that even 
long conflicts are sometimes won by strong actors, we wanted to test this second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong 
actor winning the war will decrease. 
In several historical asymmetric warfare cases, stronger actors participating in 
warfare had different levels of democracy. In some conflicts, strong actors had a high level 
of democracy, and in other cases, a low level of democracy. For example, in the first 
Russian-Chechen war, when the Russians were building a democratic state, they lost 
against the Chechens in a short period of time. Still, as there is no single explanation in the 
literature concerning whether the regime type of the stronger actor and the conflict duration 
are interrelated in similar ways in each conflict, we decided to analyze it. Thus, again we 
decided to test the relationship between regime type and outcome of the conflict. Our third 
and fourth hypothesis regarding the regime type are as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: There is an interaction between conflict duration and the type of 
government (democracy) of the strong actor as the duration of a conflict increases: namely, 
the likelihood that a democratic strong actor will win the conflict will decrease much faster 
than for a non-democratic strong actor. 
Hypothesis 4: Even if the conflict duration increases, the probability of a strong 
democratic actor’s winning the war is higher than the probability of a non-democratic 
actor’s winning the war. 
In order to study criteria for success in asymmetric warfare, we focus on the five 
variables, which we used to build a logistic regression model, represented in Equation 1. 
The logistic regression is a predictive analysis technique to explain the relationship 
between a dependent binary variable and one or more independent variables. Using this 
model, we tested whether or not a strong actor (the government) will win or lose in an 
asymmetric war against a weak actor (the non-state actor); this outcome is represented by 
the dependent variable, W, in relationship with the following independent variables:  
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 The number of actors that have offered external support to a non-state actor 
each year of the conflict, S;  
 The duration of the conflict, D, in days;  
 The regime type of the strong actor (democracy or not) each year, R;  
and the following control variables:  
 GDP (gross domestic product) of the country in millions of dollars per year, 
G;  
 The population number of the country, P, each year.  
The model is represented by the following equation:  
Pr⁡(𝑊) = ⁡
𝑒(𝜂+𝛼𝑆+𝛽𝐷+𝛾𝑅+𝛿𝐺+𝜇𝑃)
1+𝑒(𝜂+𝛼𝑆+𝛽𝐷+𝛾𝑅+𝛿𝐺+𝜇𝑃)
  (1)  
Because the dependent variable, W, is binary, taking the value of either 0 or 1, a 
logistic regression model is applied: the stronger actor will win if Pr(W) takes the value of 
1 or will lose if Pr(W) takes a value of 0. The parameters α, β, γ, δ, and μ are coefficients 
representing the amount of change occurring in each of the variables; the estimate of the 
error is the parameter η. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
In order to test our hypothesis, we analyzed the outcomes of conflicts via the 
following steps. First, based on the literature review discussed in the previous chapter,58 
we identified various factors to evaluate their importance to war outcome. Because it is 
important to obtain an unbiased estimate of a causal effect and to make sure that the 
coefficient does not suffer from omitted variable that may affect the outcome, we included 
two control variables in the analysis. Third, we noted whether or not war resulted in the 
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weak actor winning against strong state actors in all previous and current conflicts during 
the last fifty years. 
To test our hypotheses, and in order to get the values of our dependent variable, we 
utilized the following data sets: from Uppsala Conflict Data Program Department of Peace 
and Conflict Research, we used the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset version 2–2015, 
which identifies conflict outcomes from 1946 to 2015.59 Armed conflict is defined by 
UCDP as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar-year.”60 For our analysis, we 
considered peace agreements and ceasefire agreements to be the same as winning for the 
government side. The data set is the “ucdp-term-dyadic-2015” data set, which indicates 
which actor wins a conflict each year. A conflict episode is defined as “the continuous 
period of active conflict years in the UCDP-PRIO armed conflict dataset,”61 and it ends 
when “an active year is followed by a year in which there are fewer than twenty-five battle 
related deaths.”62 In our analysis, we looked at the outcome of a government win 
(Outcome=1,2,3). We recorded the outcome as a victory (1) if the conflict resulted in a 
Peace agreement, Ceasefire agreement or Victory for government side; otherwise, the 
recorded value was 0.  
To gather information on the five variables, we used three additional data sets. The 
first data set, also downloaded from UCDP, is the “extsup_large” data set, which contains 
information about the state actors offering external support for the weak actor. In the UCDP 
definition, the external supporter is “a party providing external support. The external 
supporter needs not be otherwise involved in any armed conflict, it can be a state 
government, a diaspora, a non-state rebel group, organization such as an NGO or IGO, a 
                                                 
59 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Number of Conflicts, 
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60 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. 
61 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. 
62 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. 
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political party, a company or a lobby group, or even an individual.”63 Based on the kind of 
items and materials offered by the external supporter, UCDP differentiates between ten 
types of external support, “Troops as secondary warring party (literal X), Access to 
Territory (literal L), Access to military or intelligence infrastructure (literal Y), Weapons 
(literal W), Materiel/Logistics (literal M), Training/Expertise (literal T), Funding/
Economic Support (literal $), Intelligence material (literal I), Other forms of support (literal 
O), Unknown support (literal U).”64 In this study, we are not going to build our model 
based on the type of external support but rather on the number of external supporters 
providing support for the receiver in each year of the conflict. 
The second data set, which we used to catalogue the regime type of the strong actor 
(democratic or non-democratic), is the “p4v2015”65 from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, which provides us the regime type by country by year. We decided 
that where the level of polity2 ≤ 6, there is no democracy (democracy value is 0), while if 
polity2 > 6, the regime type of a specific state in a given year is a democracy (democracy 
value is 1). To calculate the durations of conflicts we used the “ucdp-term-dyadic-2015” 
dataset. The last data set is “wdi_1960_2015,”66 downloaded from the World Bank 
Databank, which provides us information about countries’ GDP and population. 
It is important to note that the variables used in our regression model have some 
missing values. In certain observations, some missing data for certain variables have 
caused the elimination of the data for the other variables. This variation in observations, 
however, did not significantly affect the regression analysis when all the variables were 
introduced together. Furthermore, in the context of statistical analysis, there were not many 
conflicts during the period of our analysis, so the number of observations is relatively low: 
the maximum number of observations is 1,636; when we combine all the variables, the 
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number of observations drops to 1,345. The few missing data therefore have only a small 
effect on the analysis. 
B. LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
Using the Logistic Regression Model (LGM) to test the effect of these independent 
and control variables on the outcome of a conflict between a strong actor (the government) 
in an asymmetric conflict with a weak actor (the non-state actor) produced the following 
results (Table 1). These results reveal the effects of three independent variables on the 
likelihood of a strong actor winning or losing the conflict. The regression model is applied 
to the period 1946 to 2015.  
In order to test the consistency of our independent variables, we tested six models 
presented in Table 1. The first Model (1) is the base regression model having only the 
external support as independent variable. Model (2) has as independent variables the 
external support in addition to the conflict duration. Model (3) contains as independent 
variables, the external support, the conflict duration, in addition to the regime type of the 
strong actor. In Model (4), in addition to all the independent variables we include an 
interaction between regime type and conflict duration. In Model (5) we include the two 
control variables without the interaction. Finally, in Model (6) all the independent variables 
and the control variables were included, in addition to the interaction. 
  
21 
Table 1.   Logistic regression—Conflict outcome from 1945–2015. 
 Dependent variable: 
 gov_win 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
l_external_support_count -0.799*** -0.648*** 
-
0.498*** 
-
0.519*** 
-
0.521*** 
-
0.542*** 
 (0.160) (0.164) (0.173) (0.174) (0.188) (0.188) 
l_conflict_duration  -0.214*** 
-
0.218*** 
-
0.179*** 
-
0.215*** 
-
0.175*** 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) 
Democracy   -0.206 0.882* 0.531** 1.551*** 
   (0.213) (0.452) (0.262) (0.509) 
l_conflict_duration:democracy    
-
0.202*** 
 -0.188** 
    (0.076)  (0.081) 
Lgdp     -0.169** -0.151** 
     (0.073) (0.073) 
Lpop     
-
0.378*** 
-
0.383*** 
     (0.072) (0.073) 
Constant -1.779*** -0.601*** 
-
0.559*** 
-
0.758*** 
6.919*** 6.665*** 
 (0.099) (0.180) (0.184) (0.203) (1.395) (1.408) 
Observations 1,636 1,636 1,515 1,515 1,345 1,345 
Log Likelihood -535.743 -511.157 
-
490.696 
-
487.109 
-
426.110 
-
423.331 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,075.487 1,028.314 989.392 984.218 864.220 860.662 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
C. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Based on our analysis, the results of the statistical analysis support all four 
hypotheses. 
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(1) Hypothesis 1: The more external support a non-state actor has, the less 
likely it is that the strong actor can win the conflict. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between these two variables. The number of 
external supporters is logarithmically represented. As the number of external supporters 
for the non-state actors increases, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict 
decreases from 0.09 to 0.03.  
 
Figure 1.  Relationship between number of external supporter and strong 
actor winning. 
The negative slope seen in Figure 1 and the statistically significant (p < 0.01) 
coefficient for the external support count (Table 1, Model 5) indicate that the effect of 
external support is very significant and indicate that strong actor (government) are less 
likely to win if more external support is offered to the weak actor (non-state actor). 
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(2) Hypothesis 2: As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of 
the strong actor winning the war decreases. 
As in the case of hypothesis 1, the analysis results of the relationship between the 
strong winning the conflict and conflict duration is inversely proportional. The duration of 
the conflict is logarithmically represented in Figure 2. As the conflict takes a longer time 
to conclude, the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease from 30 
percent to 5 percent: 
 
Figure 2.  Relationship between conflict duration and strong actor 
winning. 
The negative slope (Figure 2) and statistically significant (p < 0.01) coefficient for 
the conflict duration (Table 1, Model 5) mean that the effect of the conflict duration is very 
significant and indicates that, as the conflict takes more time to finish, strong actors 
(government) are less likely to win against weak actors (non-state actor). 
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(3) Hypothesis 3: As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of 
the strong democratic actor’s winning the war decreases much faster than 
non-democratic strong actor. 
Again, the analysis results of the relationship between the strong winning the 
conflict and conflict duration is inversely proportional. The conflict duration is 
logarithmically represented in Figure 3. Moreover, there is an interaction between conflict 
duration and the regime type (democracy) of the strong actor: as the duration of a conflict 
grows, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease much 
faster than for a non-democratic strong actor. 
 
Figure 3.  Relationship between conflict duration and regime type. 
The negative slope (Figure 3) and statistically significant (p < 0.01) coefficient for 
the interaction between democracy and conflict duration (Table 1, Model 6) mean that the 
effect of the regime type of the strong actor is very significant and indicates that, as the 
conflict takes more time to finish, the probability of democratic actors (government) 
25 
winning against weak actors (non-state actor) decreases much faster than for non-
democratic states. When we shift democracy from low to high while holding all other 
variables constant at their means, it generates a much faster decrease in the probability of 
the strong actors (government) winning against weak actors (non-state actor). 
(4) Hypothesis 4: Even if the conflict duration increases, the probability of a 
strong democratic actor’s winning the war is higher than the probability of 
a non-democratic actor’s winning the war. 
The conflict duration is logarithmically represented. Moreover, there is an 
interaction between conflict duration and the regime type (democracy) of the strong actor: 
even when the duration of a conflict grows, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor 
winning the conflict against weak non-state actors will still be higher than for a non-
democratic strong actor. 
The negative slope seen in the Figure 3 and the statistically significant (p < 0.01) 
coefficient for the interaction between democracy and conflict duration seen in Table 1, 
Model 6 mean that the effect of the regime type of the strong actor is very significant and 
indicates that the probability of democratic actors (government) winning against weak 
actors (non-state actor) is higher than for non-democratic actors. When we shift democracy 
from low to high while holding all other variables constant at their means, it generates a 
much higher probability for the strong actors (government) winning against weak actors 
(non-state actor). 
These results affirm that the four hypotheses tested in our analysis are supported. 
The independent variables included in our analysis are statistically significant for 
understanding which factors affect the outcome of conflicts between strong actors and 
weak actors in an asymmetric war.  
To summarily measure the accuracy of our quantitative diagnostic tests, we used 
the Area Under Curve (AUC). AUC indicates the uncertainty of the estimate: a test with a 
low accuracy has an AUC of 0.5, while a test with perfect accuracy has an AUC of 1. 
Figure 4 indicates that all our tests have AUC values between 0.7 and 0.75. Our full model 
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– including all independent variables plus the interaction – has the strongest model fit, 
relative to the more basic models.  
 
Figure 4.  AUC/ROC curves for models 3 (blue), 4 (red), 5 (green) and 
6 (brown). 
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IV. CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In comprehensive realistic analysis of war outcomes in general, one will realize that 
there exist several conditions, which in combination with one another affect the outcome 
of a specific war. In order to analyze further the results of our statistical approach, and to 
provide historical evidence for our findings, we use three illustrative case studies. In these 
case studies, we will focus on three factors that have been the key elements in our study: 
number of external supporters, duration of the conflict, and regime type of the strong actor. 
In our analysis, we will show that in each case, one of the factors had affected significantly 
the outcome of the specific war. In order to support our statistical analyses, we chose to 
analyze the following cases:  
 The more external support a non-state actor has, the less likely it is that the 
strong actor can win the conflict—Iranian support to Hezbollah.  
 As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong actor’s 
winning the war decreases—The French—Algerian War. 
 As the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong 
democratic actor’s winning the war decreases much faster than non-
democratic strong actor—First Chechen War.  
B. IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR HEZBOLLAH 
Now that we have outlined the variables that play an important role in the outcomes 
of asymmetric conflicts, we are going to examine and analyze a set of case studies that 
illustrate the role of these variables. We begin with a case study of Iranian support for 
Hezbollah, which demonstrates how much external support can help non-state actors to 
win against strong actors in asymmetric wars and change the outcome of asymmetric 
conflict. As Merom argues, the fact that democracies have failed in small wars because of 
their domestic structure does not mean that international and other causes do not also 
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contribute to such failure.67 In this case study, as our model has showed, we will argue that 
the probability of Israel (strong actor) winning was decreased because Hezbollah (weak 
actor) had Iran as an external supporter. 
Since 1948, when Lebanon joined other Arab nations to fight against the newly 
formed Jewish state, Lebanon and Israel have remained officially in a state of war. The 
state of Israel launched three major wars against Lebanon, in 1978, 1982, and 2006, in 
addition to smaller conflicts in 1993 and 1996. In this section, we are going to analyze the 
Iranian support to Hezbollah and show how this support played a significant role in the 
conduct and outcome of the war between Israel and Hezbollah.  
Before we discuss the role of Iranian support in these conflicts, it is useful to 
understand the background that led to these conflicts. In reprisal for repeated Palestinian 
attacks, and after Operation Deir Yassin, which caused the death of 37 Israelis and the 13 
Palestinian combatants who sailed from Tyre in Lebanon to Tel Aviv in Israel, in 1978, 
Israel launched a major invasion of southern Lebanon, “Operation Litany.”68 It took Israel 
five days to occupy all of southern Lebanon, about 10 percent of the Lebanese territory. 
After the UN Security Council adopted resolution 425, Israel withdrew from Lebanon and 
handed over a narrow border strip to its proxy, the South Lebanon Army (mainly a 
Christian militia), not to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Lebanon 
has three main religious factions: Twenty seven percent of the population are Muslim Shia, 
27 percent Muslim Sunni, and around 40 percent Christians.69 
In June 1982, Israel took a Palestinian group’s attempt to assassinate Israel’s 
ambassador to the UK as basis for launching a full-scale invasion of Lebanon.70 Ninety 
thousand men, or six and a half divisions, plus one in reserve, with some 1,300 tanks and 
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1,500 armored personnel carriers, crossed the border.71 In a matter of weeks, the Israel 
Defense Force (IDF) had destroyed the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) 
military branch, killed 1,200 Syrian soldiers, took 300 Syrian prisoners, and destroyed 
more than 300 Syrian tanks.72 The Israeli air force took out Syrian SAM missiles in the 
Beqaa Valley and shot down some 80 aircraft, about a quarter of the Syrian air force, with 
a loss of only one of its own.73 The Israeli army reached Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, 
after defeating all the states and the non-state actors. 
In the wake of this violence several factors led to the creation of Hezbollah. For 
one, in the late 1970s, the Shia, the poorest and most oppressed of Lebanon’s communities, 
mainly located in the south and east of Lebanon, had suffered vastly from this Lebanese 
Israeli war due to their geographic location near the Israeli border. They had first been 
driven, under Israeli retaliatory raids, from their homes in the South to Beirut; as Hirst 
describes it, “from the South to Beirut and back, it was an infernal cycle that went on and 
on.”74 Furthermore, as Saad-Ghorayeb describes, “the mass destruction wreaked by 
Israel’s 1982 invasion, the brutality of its subsequent occupation of the south and the west’s 
concomitant intervention in Lebanon spawned various Shiite Islamic resistance groups that 
coalesced to form Hezbollah.”75 This Islamic resistance, a mainly Shia sectarian, which 
had as its main objective to repel the Israeli army and free the Lebanese occupied territories, 
began to rise. During the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, Iran began to help the Shia in 
Lebanon. Hezbollah, an Islamic resistance against Israeli occupation, was born. 
Another factor that contributed to the creation of Hezbollah was the Iranian 
revolution. Saad-Ghorayeb argues that “the important factor explaining the Shiites non-
resistance and the non-materialization of the Islamic resistance during the 1978 invasion 
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was that the Islamic revolution in Iran had not yet taken place.”76 Thus, the Shia began to 
use military actions in 1982, after the Iranian revolution in 1979. It follows that the Shia 
“Islamicisation” was a necessary condition of their resistance to Israel and of the birth of 
Hezbollah.77 Expressed explicitly by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, “if Israel 
hadn’t invaded Lebanon, I do not know whether something called Hezbollah would have 
been born. I doubt it.”78 
Even if Hezbollah is a Lebanese resistance group, its fountainhead is the religious 
institutions of Najaf in Iraq, where Lebanese Shia studied in the nineteen seventies under 
the guidance of radical Shia such as Ayatollah Khomeini and Muhammad Baqir al 
Sadr.79According to Saad-Ghorayeb, it was highly unlikely that the Islamic resistance 
would have been amplified without Iran’s financial, political, and logistic support: “its 
military capability would have been greatly retarded, and it would have taken Hezbollah 
an additional fifty years to attain the same achievements in the absence of Iranian 
support.”80 Furthermore, Saad-Ghorayeb argues that, the 1,500 Revolutionary Guard 
troops dispatched in the Beqaa valley after the Israel’s 1982 invasion flourished 
Hezbollah.81 
In 1985, after achieving their goal of expelling the PLO armed forces, and due to 
the increased number of ambushes by the Lebanese resistance and its own failure to change 
the political landscape of Lebanon, Israel retreated partially after three years of occupation. 
Israel continued occupying the south of Lebanon as a security zone. The success of Israel 
in eliminating the armed Palestinian presence in 1982 permitted other resistance groups to 
come to the fore, and Hezbollah, the new non-state actor, replaced the PLO and began its 
resistance against Israel.82 These Lebanese militants are described by Hirst as “an intrinsic 
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part of a much greater movement. By the 1980s, political, fundamentalist Islam had 
supplanted nationalism as the great new credo and popularly mobilizing force of the Middle 
East and beyond.”83 But unlike the PLO forces, Hezbollah’s warriors were native and 
home-grown, which was a source of strength the Palestinians never had. The resistance of 
Hezbollah against Israel continues. 
Iran not only played a role in the origin of Hezbollah but actually supported its 
activities and operations in all its wars against Israel. To understand how essential Iranian 
support was to the success of Hezbollah, it is necessary to discuss something important that 
Hezbollah began to use in the battlefield in 1994: the video camera. Hirst described a 
particularly important incident that was caught on camera. 
Before dawn, a week later, some twenty mujahedeen with rifles, machine 
guns, rocket-launchers and a video crept up Dabshe’s perilously exposed 
western slope and, at 8.30 am, in broad daylight, they assaulted the fortress 
on top, manned by a unit of the elite Givati Regiment and equipped with 
Merkava tanks, armored cars and sophisticated automatic firing devices. Of 
the four soldiers on west-side sentry duty, three fled or cowered beneath the 
ramparts and a fourth, under sniper fire, could do nothing. The other seventy 
just sat in their bunkers. The assailants walked to the post, hurled grenades 
into it and hoisted the Hezbollah flag above it.84  
This extraordinary exploit, recorded by the video camera, became a sensation on 
Israeli and Arab televisions throughout the region. For the first time in this war, the video 
camera was used to film real attacks on Israeli defense points. Hezbollah’s camouflaged 
cameramen accompanied the fighters on the most audacious of operations and got their on-
site footage back to Beirut in time for peak-hour news bulletins on Hezbollah’s television 
station. Al-Manar soon became one of the most popular television stations in an Arab world 
thrilled and astonished at the spectacle of a little band of freelance fighters inflicting such 
pain on an Israeli army at whose hands its regular Arab counterparts had suffered little but 
serial defeat and humiliation.85 Since that day, most of the attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli 
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defense forces have been caught on camera and diffused over the Internet or broadcasted 
on Al-Manar television.  
Al-Manar first broadcast on June 3, 1991. With continuous financial support from 
Iran, “the station has grown from a clandestine, ramshackle operation to a comprehensive 
satellite station.”86 It has become a dominant instrument in what Hezbollah calls its 
“psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy,” keeping the focus of the Arab world 
on the Israeli - Palestinian conflict.87 The station has reportedly received money from Iran 
since its foundation. According to Nayef Krayem, previous chairman and general manager 
of al-Manar’s board, al-Manar’s yearly operating budget was approximately $15 million, 
with a vital portion of this amount coming from Iran.88 Again, the Iranian support has 
played a major role in helping Hezbollah in its fight against Israel by helping the 
organization propagandize its ideology to the Arab countries in order to get their support.  
This resistance against Israel continued until 1996, when Israel replied with force. 
On April 11, 1996, in response to the repeated Hezbollah rocket attacks on the northern 
region of Israel, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched “Grapes of Wrath,” an intense 
sixteen-day attack on Lebanon. To achieve its goal, Israel carried out 600 air raids and fired 
around 25,000 artillery shells into Lebanese territory. One hundred fifty-four Lebanese 
civilians were killed and 351 injured. Hezbollah fired 639 Katyusha missiles into Israel, 
but no Israeli civilian casualties were reported.89 This attack was a form of pressure on the 
Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah and stop its resistance against Israeli occupation 
of south Lebanon.90 
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On April 18, 1996, a dramatic turning point in the campaign occurred: just after 
2:00 pm local time, thirteen 155-mm antipersonnel howitzer shells fired by the Israelis 
struck the local UNIFIL compound in Qana, near Tyre. According to the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, “Thirteen high explosive shells directly hit the compound or 
detonated over it, eight of which were proximity fuse shells. These shells inflict death or 
bodily harm rather than material destruction, because they detonate above ground when 
closest to their targets, rather than exploding upon impact.”91 As a result of this massacre, 
102 people were killed, half of them children. The children were buried in only eighty-
three coffins, because nineteen of them had been blown into so many pieces that they could 
not be put together again.92 Soon after the massacre the live coverage of the scene was 
disseminated all over the world via satellite and Internet. 
Tele Liban reporters and cameramen where among the first to arrive in 
Qana. Their memory and cameras recorded a day that would never be 
forgotten in the history of humankind. Tele Liban ran exclusively the first 
footage of the massacre on air, which enabled international TV channels to 
feed these images from Tele Liban to the world. In all cases the images do 
not need any commentary.93 
After the massacre at Qana, a ceasefire was called; the American Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher, headed to the region to arrange it. A written but unsigned agreement 
prohibited the Israelis from attacking civilians and civilian targets in Lebanon.  
Although this particular conflict had ended, a new era for Hezbollah had begun. 
After Grapes of Wrath, Iran began to supply Hezbollah with a whole new category of 
advanced weaponry, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, Russian-made Saggers, and American 
TOWs. Hezbollah began its hybrid warfare against Israel using advanced light and heavy 
weaponry provided by Iran and Syria. Hezbollah soon multiplied the number of its 
operations, from an average of around two hundred operations per year before 1996 to one 
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thousand a year thereafter, reaching a peak of 1,500 in 2000.94 By 1997, after a five or 
even ten-to-one casualty rate in previous years, it had almost achieved parity: Hezbollah 
lost 60 men in combat, compared with 39 Israelis, the highest figure ever, and 25 from the 
south Lebanese army (SLA).95 The following year, Hezbollah killed more of its enemies 
(24 Israelis, 33 SLA) than the 38 it lost.96  
This hybrid warfare, combined with the support received from Iran, continued for 
four years, until Israel retreated from Lebanon. In the early hours of May 23, 2000, the last 
Israeli soldiers left Lebanon and made their dash to the border. No doubt the hybrid warfare 
strategy used by Hezbollah played a major role in the liberation of Lebanon, but without 
the external support from Iran this triumph would not have happened. Still, even though 
Israel has retreated from the Lebanese territories, Israel still occupies some small areas in 
Lebanon, including Mazareh Chabaa and Tilal Kfarchouba and it did not release its 
Lebanese prisoners until 2006.  
Just after nine o’clock on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah special forces opened fire with 
heavy machine-gun and anti-tank weapons on two Israeli armored Humvees, killing their 
three occupants. They wounded two soldiers and pulled out the other two. A tank engaged 
these forces, crossing the border, and ran over a Hezbollah-laid mine; its four-man crew 
was killed. The eighth Israeli soldier died in a hail of Hezbollah mortar fire.97 Because of 
these events, Israel’s strategy for the destruction of Hezbollah came in two parts. One, 
exclusively military, was to take it on directly. The other, military in method but essentially 
political in purpose, was to inflict escalating pain and punishment on the Lebanese state 
and people, as “Operation Accountability” in 1993 and “Grapes of Wrath” in 1996.98 On 
the battlefield, Hezbollah used defensive hybrid warfare to resist and repel the Israeli 
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attacks. Hezbollah showed high capabilities and tactics well beyond what Israel expected. 
Hezbollah fully exploited the Lebanese rocky terrain, which is ideal for dismounted 
movement for armored maneuvers and offers excellent fields of fire. Hezbollah used 
advanced battlefield tactics by combining heavy weaponry such as mortars, rockets, anti-
tank missiles, surface-to-air, and surface-to-ship missiles, all provided by Iran. Hezbollah 
also mined the roads used by Israeli tanks. Of the four hundred Merkava MK-4 tanks that 
Israel had deployed, forty were hit by Hezbollah’s Iranian anti-tank missiles, twenty were 
destroyed, and thirty tank crewmen were killed. Although inferior in numbers, Hezbollah 
units were cohesive, well trained, disciplined, and proficient in how to hold the territory.  
Furthermore, due to the complex and reliable communication system provided by 
Iran, Hezbollah troops were able to maintain contact with their chain of command. With 
help from Iran, Hezbollah built a complex communication system that allowed it to 
maintain an effective communication for two or three-man squad operations in dispersed 
combat.99 This Iranian support in building a strong communication system for Hezbollah, 
made Hezbollah win the electronic war against Israel. Hezbollah successfully used 
hedgehog defense tactics. Throughout the conflict, as part of its strategic messaging, 
Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel using concealed launchers. Hezbollah 
caught Israel by surprise by using this hybrid warfare, and the war did not go very well for 
Israel. While giving a speech on al-Manar television—which Israel was trying 
unsuccessfully to silence by hitting its infrastructure—Hassan Nasrallah told the Arab 
world that, at this moment, Hezbollah was going to hit an Israeli warship. A sophisticated 
Iranian-made C802 radar-guided missile had been fired on an Israeli warship, hitting it and 
killing four of its crew.100 After 33 days of conflict, 119 Israeli soldiers, and more than 40 
civilians were killed. On the other hand, more than 1,000 Lebanese died over the course of 
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the fighting, most of them civilians.101 But in the end, Israel lost this conflict, making this 
its first defeat in an Arab Israeli War. 
Quickly after the war, Hezbollah made a decision to start paying to the fifteen 
thousand Lebanese people whose properties were damaged;102 Hassan Nasrallah said, “we 
will pay compensation, a certain amount of money for every family to rent for one year, 
plus buy furniture for those whose homes were totally destroyed.”103 Nasrallah also said 
that Hezbollah would rebuild destroyed businesses and houses, and he promised those 
concerned that they would “not need to ask anyone for money or wait in queues” to get 
relief funds because “you are in good hands with Hezbollah.” And that is what Hezbollah 
did, which cost Iran around $3 billion to rebuild the damaged houses.104 The result of the 
war has showed that Iranian support—military, technologically, and financially—and the 
hybrid warfare used by Hezbollah had defeated the Israelis and stopped the invasion of 
south Lebanon. 
No one argues that Hezbollah did not play a major role in the liberation of the 
Lebanese territory, but without the Iranian support, this liberation would not have 
happened. Even as many strategists argue that the hybrid warfare used by Hezbollah 
allowed it to win the conflict, this hybrid warfare could not have been executed without the 
Iranian support.  
In conclusion, after showing the effectiveness of Hezbollah in its resistance against 
Israel, we argue that Hezbollah having Iran as an external supporter lowered the likelihood 
of Israel the stronger actor to win its wars against Hezbollah the weaker actor. Hezbollah, 
with its freedom to maneuver, stealthy swarming tactics, and access to Iranian advanced 
weaponry played a decisive role in defending the Lebanese territory against Israel. Without 
Iranian support, Hezbollah would not have a powerful TV station that could broadcast the 
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atrocity of the crimes committed by Israel during its wars against Lebanon to the Arab 
world and oblige Israel to stop its war against Lebanon in 1996. Without Iranian 
technological support and their communication system, Hezbollah would not have been 
able to maintain communication between its chain of command and its fighters during the 
2006 war and win the electronic war against Israel. It can be argued further that, without 
Iranian financial support, Hezbollah could not gain the trust and confidence of and pay for 
the Lebanese people whose houses and businesses were destroyed in the 2006 conflict. 
Because of Iranian support, the superiority of Israeli military forces, which allowed them 
win all their wars against all the Arab countries, proved a weakness against Hezbollah. 
Iranian support had changed the outcome of the war and made Israel, a strong actor, lose 
its war against Hezbollah, the weaker actor in this asymmetric conflict. In the next case 
study, we will study the effect of conflict duration in asymmetric wars and show how it 
affect it outcome. 
Figure 1 shows how when the number of external supporters for the non-state actors 
increases, the probability of the state actor winning the war will decrease. In the case of 
Hezbollah, our model would have predicted the outcome. According to our model, if 
Hezbollah did not have external support the probability of Israel winning the conflict would 
be 8.5 percent. Because Hezbollah receive external support from Iran, our model shows 
that the probability of Israel winning would decrease to 7 percent. If our model were to 
include Syria, which also offered external support for Hezbollah, the number of external 
supporters would be two, and so the probability of Israel winning the war would decrease 
more to be 5.5 percent. Because Israel is a democratic state, and because the conflict took 
too much time to finish, our model (Figure 3) also predicted that the likelihood of Israel 
winning the war will decrease. The result of the statistical analysis in Chapter III and the 
case study of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah confirm our first hypothesis: As 
the number of actors providing external support to the non-state actor increases, the 
likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease. 
In the next chapter, we will examine the French-Algerian and how the duration of 
the conflict affected the outcome of that war and led the French Army to a strategic failure. 
38 
C. FRENCH ALGERIAN WAR 
In this case study, we will argue that conflict duration had an impact on the outcome 
of the asymmetric war between France and Algeria in the French-Algerian war, 1954–
1962. In particular, the conflict duration enabled the immoral conduct of warfare by French 
Army; this prolonged immoral counterinsurgency campaign in turn negatively affected the 
French people’s support to the French government. Synergy between conflict duration and 
decreasing support to the government impacted the outcome of the conflict, leading the 
French Army to strategic failure in the French-Algerian war.  
In order to build some background for discussion, we will introduce the strategies 
and tactics chosen by Algeria and France during the conflict. We will describe the methods 
and effects of the counterinsurgency campaign conducted by the French Army and analyze 
the outcomes of the French strategy. To conclude our discussion and support our claim, we 
will present how the opinion of the French populace concerning the conflict changed over 
time. 
1. Background 
In the beginning of the crisis, the French government faced a dilemma: the question 
was not whether they should fight the war against Algerian resistance forces, but how they 
should fight.105 Scholars argue that there was a reason for keeping Algeria under the 
control of France: by controlling Algeria, Paris had an opportunity to preserve the empire 
and opportunity to conduct imperial and global affairs.106 According to Merom, 
there were quite a few sound reasons, at least from a Realpolitik point of 
view, to preserve the empire, and particularly Algeria, under French control. 
In general, the empire provided human and strategic resources and global 
bases that gave France an opportunity to be involved in world affairs. 
Within the empire, Algeria was the “crown jewel.” In fact, it provided its 
strategic value during World War II as a depository of oil and gas reserves 
as a nuclear test site during the later years of the Algerian war. Besides, it 
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had been part of France for some 130 years, with some one million French 
settlers.107  
The key question for France in this upcoming fight was how to maintain the balance 
between effective levels of violence on the battlefield and moral tolerances back home: 
how to sustain domestic support for government actions and how to choose a 
comprehensive strategy to counter the irregular threat in Algeria. Before we explain the 
French tactical success, which arguably caused the later strategic failure, we need to 
describe the chosen strategies for both sides in the Algerian war. 
2. Adapting Strategies 
From the Algerian perspective, the resistance against the colonial French had a long 
and violent history. A remarkable increase in support for separatism in Algeria followed 
the tragic events in the city of Setif in 1945, when small riots were countered by French 
forces in an overreaction that culminated in martial law. Estimated casualties for the 
Algerian nationalist side exceeded over six thousand people. Over the following years, 
several independence movements developed and expanded in Algeria. Although the 
French used several countermeasures to decrease the size and capabilities of resistance 
movements, by 1954, Front de Liberation Nationale, the FLN, had gained enough 
resources and popular support to launch its anti-French resistance campaign.108  
One can conclude that, conceptually, FLN used against France a three-stage 
insurgency strategy. During the first stage, the FLN eliminated or merged rival 
independence movements, built up their organizational structure, and focused on 
recruitment efforts. Their target audience consisted mainly of the poor Arab and Berber 
populations who were living in rural areas, far from central law enforcement capabilities 
used by French authorities. The second stage consisted of multiple small-scale “hit and 
run” attacks against French forces and installations; the main goal for this second stage was 
to communicate FLN’s capabilities to hit chosen targets effectively. These small-scale 
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targeting operations were meant to humiliate French forces and capabilities and to inspire 
additional followers to join FLN’s ranks. In the third stage, the resistance forces were 
meant to be ready to counter the French Army in conventional warfare in order to secure 
control over the Algerian territory.109 
In response to the FLN resistance, for the French, the first years of the war were the 
time when they developed future strategies. Initially, the French side underestimated the 
magnitude of the upcoming struggle and decided to deal with the situation from a police 
tactics perspective. By 1956, the French Government had realized the seriousness of the 
conflict and responded with a large-scale conventional military campaign. According to 
M. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, “In 1955–56 the French government’s initial response to 
the deteriorating security situation had been a series of major increases in troop level. This 
began in 1956 with a recall for reservists.”110 While at the beginning of the conflict the 
number of French troops in Algeria was 57,000, by mid-summer 1956, the growth of forces 
in Algeria had reached 400,000 troops.111  
After two years of constant struggle, the French realized that they were fighting 
against a capable resistance force and that just adjusting their troop size would not solve 
the problem. Besides the remarkable change in force size, the French forces changed their 
fighting doctrine: they abandoned the conventional warfare approach and launched a broad 
counterinsurgency campaign. The new tactical-level counterinsurgency approach, “Guerre 
Révolutionnaire,” was introduced to the Algerian battleground.112 The new tactics come 
along with troop increases, which enabled France to bring into the Algerian theater the 
French forces that had been previously deployed in Indochina. Indeed, the newly 
implemented tactics were mainly a reflection of recent combat experiences in Indochina. 
The core idea for the counterinsurgency campaign was that French troops would win the 
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“hearts and minds” of local people, mainly by providing an alternative ideology for the 
future. The core problem for this counterinsurgency campaign was that “That ideology was 
liberal French democratic ideology with strong Christian overtones,”113 strongly 
contradictory to the Algerian Muslim population’s views.  
Though contradictory at the ideological level, the counterinsurgency tactics 
implemented by French forces were in general successful and supported the overall 
campaign plan. These effective tactics consisted of several core components of 
counterinsurgency, which, according to DiMarco, the were the following: “isolating the 
insurgency from support; providing local security; executing effective strike operations; 
establishing French political legitimacy and effective indigenous political and military 
forces; and establishing a robust intelligence capability.”114  
Although all of these elements were essential for tactical-level success, we will 
elaborate on the role of France’s robust intelligence-gathering capabilities, as they were the 
most controversial and had the greatest effect on the outcome of the war. Several experts 
argue that the methods the French used to gather intelligence during the conflict, 
particularly torture, flipped the initial French tactical success and caused the later strategic 
failure.115 As Merom puts it, “The wish to balance conflicting battlefield and domestic 
demands, as well as the nature of the Algerian war, forced the French to emphasize 
counterinsurgency methods, torture in particular, which were in sharp opposition to the 
values of a significant portion of French soldiers and citizens.”116 The French Army mainly 
used the method of torturing in order to support and enable the Army’s targeting operations. 
During the Algerian war, the following practices were widely used: intelligence 
components of the system gathered essential information by using torture during 
interrogations; the gathered data was analyzed and forwarded to quick-reaction forces; and 
combat elements launched raids on targets and killed or captured targeted enemy personnel.  
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From a military and tactical perspective, the chosen tactics worked as intended. But 
one should not forget that the desired end state for French counterinsurgency operations 
was to win the “hearts and minds” of the local populace, not to lose them. 
As the method of torture was widely used, one should study how it was justified by 
democratic France’s soldiers and decision makers.117 The need for such justification 
become relevant for the army itself, but also for the domestic audience in France. Ideas 
used to justify the immoral conduct of warfare varied from practical needs to ideological 
principles: France’s recent defeat in Indochina had shaped the French soldiers’ vision 
toward the understanding that democratic values are not tough enough for winning 
irregular wars.118 The ongoing irregular warfare campaign was so different from 
conventional battle that the French forces were convinced that success in war required 
alternative tools be used. They saw torture as a controlled method to guarantee tactical 
success and to avoid greater evil. Some elements of the French Army also perceived the 
fight in Algeria as ideological battle in a Cold War context and believed that the ends 
justified the means.119  
3. “Losing the Moral Compass” in the Algerian War120 
While the practice of torture posed some immediate problems for French forces, 
those problems only worsened as the duration of the conflict grew longer. This increasing 
normalization of torture influenced the outcome of the conflict in a number of ways.  
For one, it resulted in internal fragmentation of the French Army officer corps121 
and as the practice of the torture increased over time the unity in the Army loosened. This 
fragmentation inside the Army led to less capable decision making, which in turn lowered 
the government’s trust in to Army. The French Army’s resulting failure to control the 
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situation in Algeria then influenced the conflict outcome by forcing the government to look 
for a political solution. The duration of the conflict enabled the French forces to conduct 
an immoral counterinsurgency campaign in particular, torture. French tactical success in 
battle further increased some decision makers’ acceptance of torture over time. By 1960, 
however, the immoral conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign had divided the French 
officer corps into two segments--those who supported immoral conduct of warfare and 
those who opposed it. For example: “General Jacques Paris de la Bollardière, serving as 
prefect of Algiers in 1957, resigned his post over the torture tactics used within the city.”122 
On the other hand, the French Army still included many radical supporters for immoral 
conduct of warfare in Algeria, and disagreements inside Army culminated with the aborted 
coup attempt in 1961.123 
Another problem created by the escalating practice of torture was the French 
Army’s decreasing “ability to affect the conflict’s strategic center of gravity.”124 The 
French Army’s inability to solve the causes of the struggle further decreased the 
government’s trust in the army and increased the need for political solution as the only 
feasible outcome of the conflict. The strategic center of gravity for the France was winning 
the “hearts and minds” of the Algerian people. Although the use of torture enabled tactical-
level success, it nullified the positive impacts for center of gravity at strategic-level. By 
allowing and accepting torture during interrogations, the French side created the 
prerequisites for even greater moral and legal violations. By using torture and by accepting 
methods of torture as justified ways to provide security for the Algerian people, the French 
arguably lost more “hearts and minds” than they won. Both the French and the Algerian 
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people questioned the French Army’s ability to bring a conflict to a peaceful solution with 
a desired end state for both sides. 
The third major problem created by the escalating practice of torture was that the 
substance of French’s immoral conduct of warfare provided information operations 
opportunities to the FLN.125 As the duration of the conflict increased, the number of 
immoral cases of torture also increased. This eventually led to the circumstances were the 
FLN’s information operations were effective among the Muslim population living in 
Algeria; besides this success in Algeria, the insurgency information operations were 
equally effective in the French mainland and in the United Nations.126 The failure of 
French government to launch countermeasures against FLN’s international information 
operations forced the French government to find a political solution to the conflict: because 
of its recent defeat in Indochina, France’s reputation in the international arena was already 
unfavorable, and the French government was facing the possibility that it might lose more 
in international relations than it would gain by winning the internal struggle with Algeria.  
Conflict duration enabled the acceptance of torture to take root in the French 
Army’s morality and impacted how the French Army perceived success in 
counterinsurgency warfare. That in turn impacted the French government’s decision 
making. The duration of the conflict increased the sum of negative effects caused by 
immoral conduct of the warfare in Algeria and impacted the outcome of the conflict, as it 
forced the French government to find the political solution to the conflict and decreased 
French public support to the Army and government. 
4. French Public Opinion and the Algerian War 
In the beginning of the France-Algerian war, the French Government was facing 
reasonable concerns: how to avoid the collapse of empire and how to preserve public 
support for government colonial policy. There is considerable evidence that the French 
government made efforts to keep the mainland populace’s opinion supportive. In the 
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beginning of the conflict, the French government’s official position was that there is no 
state of war between Algeria and France. The French government enforced several 
measures in order to keep public opinion supportive: Firstly, the government’s claim that 
a state of war did not exist was aimed at focusing the attention of the populace on less 
relevant issues. Secondly, from the government’s perspective, official silence allowed it to 
communicate that the crisis in Algeria was just matter of restoring public order. Thirdly, it 
attempted to deny FLN´s attempts to rally possible domestic opposition in the French 
mainland.127  
Although the government enforced these measures, still there were changes in 
French public support: namely, public opinion concerning the government’s colonial 
policy and the situation in Algeria decreased during the war. The long duration of the 
French–Algerian War gave the French public the opportunity to increase their awareness 
of and change their opinion on a number of issues, in each case influencing the outcome of 
the conflict. One such issue was the question of how and when the conflict would end: the 
longer the war went on, the more aware the French public became of immoral conduct of 
warfare in Algeria and the more they demanded a political solution.  
It is true that in the beginning of the crisis the French public shared the opinion that 
the crisis must find its optimal solution, and rather sooner than later. As Talbott describes 
it, “Indeed, as early as July 1957 a majority of the French (53 percent) favored negotiations 
with the FLN with view toward a ceasefire, a step that settler leadership strenuously 
opposed.”128 In May 1959, already half the French population supported not only the 
ceasefire but also the idea that the French government must elaborate a wider approach 
concerning the future of Algeria, including political, social, economic solutions. Finding 
the solution for the crisis became so important for the French public that, by April 1961, 
just before the beginning of the negotiations between the French government and Algerian 
revolutionary leaders, 78 percent of French people supported negotiations that might end 
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the crisis.129 In addition the public’s dissatisfaction with the impermissible methods on the 
counterinsurgency camping, this remarkable change was compounded by the French 
government’s decision to use conscripts in large numbers,130 which directly impacted 
conscripts, their families, and their social networks. The crisis became a much more 
personal matter than state-level anonymous security concerns.  
Another issue on which public opinion changed over time, thereby influencing the 
outcome of the conflict, was the future status of Algeria: as the conflict grew longer, the 
French public supported the solution of independent Algerian nation-state. This change 
contributed to the outcome of war by forcing the French government to find a political 
solution acceptable to the French domestic political audience. The French people were 
queried on their preferences regarding the future status of Algeria, they provided the 
following opinion: “Between the outbreak of the insurrection and early 1956 most said that 
they preferred the maintenance of Algeria’s departmental status.”131 In July 1957, only 18 
percent of French people preferred that, in the future, Algeria would be independent state. 
In February 1959, almost half of population were expressing the view that sooner or later 
Algeria must become an independent country and that the French government must loosen 
its political ambitions in Algeria. By 1961, on the eve of negotiations 58, percent of the 
French population expressed the opinion that Algeria must become independent, and only 
4 percent of the population were still holding the opinion that colonial Algeria belonged 
inside the French Imperium.132 Again one, can see how French people changed their 
preferences over time. Change appears in the fundamental question: Should Algeria 
become an independent state? The majority of French people initially answered that 
Algeria must stay part of France; eight years later, less than five percent supported the 
colonial solution. The duration of the conflict and immoral conduct of warfare enabled 
these changes in society. Those changes in turn forced the French government to find 
optimal solutions which would be accepted by French populace. 
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5. Strategic Failure 
Although French Army implemented effective counterinsurgency tactics in its war 
against the Algerian insurgency, that was not enough to keep Algeria in its former 
departmental status inside French Imperium. Algeria lost the French-Algerian war on the 
battlefield, but it won the strategic battle and become an independent nation-state. In this 
case study, we have showed that the conflict duration was functioning as an enabler for 
immoral conduct of warfare and that in turn caused changes in society. During the conflict, 
the French Army escalated its violence to levels that were not acceptable to the French 
domestic audience and that negatively affected their support to the French government. 
Thus, the duration of the conflict affected the outcomes of the war between France and 
Algeria. 
As we presented the results of statistical analyses in the third chapter of this thesis, 
we will confirm that our second hypothesis “as the duration of the conflict increases, the 
probability of the strong actor’s winning the war decreases,” is supported with historical 
case study from the French—Algerian war. As the conflict takes a longer time to conclude, 
the likelihood that the strong actor will win the conflict will decrease. The analysis results 
of the relationship between the strong winning the conflict and conflict duration is inversely 
proportional. As the conflict takes a longer time to conclude, the likelihood that the strong 
actor will win the conflict will decrease from 30 percent to 5 percent (the duration of the 
conflict is logarithmically represented). 
In the next chapter, we will examine the case of the first Chechen War between 
Russia and Chechenia and how the regime type of Russia affected the outcome of that war 
and led the Chechens to win. 
D. WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE FUTURE: THE FIRST CHECHEN 
WAR 
In this case study, we will argue that the regime type of the strong actor, Russia, 
had an impact on the outcome of an asymmetric war between Russia and Chechnya, the 
First Chechen War (1994-1996). James Hughes argues that the conflict between ethnic 
Chechens and the Russian Federation has several peculiarities: Firstly, it was the only 
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violent secessionist conflict from the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Secondly, the conflict can be characterized as the longest violent dispute within the 
Russian Federation.133 And thirdly, the conflict became a true challenge for the newly 
formed democratic government of the Russian Federation. Chechens are a relatively small 
ethnic group that historically have lived in the Caucasus. For the last two centuries, this 
small piece of land in the Caucasus has been like a vicious bee nest for those who have 
tried to gain control over it, and the history of Russia has seen almost constant fighting 
over Chechen inhabited territory.134 Although the last decade in Chechnya has been 
relatively peaceful, the outer world perceives tensions in the Caucasus region, not to 
mention war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 and continuous struggle between 
Caucasus non-state actors and Russian officials.  
In the first part of this case study, we will emphasize some pivotal grievances we 
believe to have played a central role in causing conflict between Chechens and Russians. 
In the second part, we will give a brief rundown of the conflict itself. In the third part, we 
will analyze the main variables that ended the first war in Chechen territory, focusing on 
two main elements: upcoming presidential elections in the Russian Federation and 
development of the freedom of press. We will argue that, besides the Chechens’ excellence 
in asymmetric warfare, the main factor leading to temporary peace in 1996 was the 
willingness of the Russian democratic government to negotiate with its opponent. We will 
thus show that the democratic regime type of Russia had an impact on the outcome of the 
First Chechen War. 
1. Causes for Tensions 
What caused the tensions in North Caucasus? A simple but not wrong answer would 
be that: there are just too many causes of violent struggle in the Caucasus; thus, there is no 
one single factor that can give us the most relevant cause of the conflicts in the region. 
James Hughes, in his study about the causes of Chechen conflict, emphasizes several 
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unaddressed grievances; he starts with the theoretical approach: “History demonstrates that 
there is often as much violence in the exit from empire as there is in empire-building.”135 
He then argues convincingly for several specific causes—historical, social and ethnic 
reasons, clash between Islam and the Orthodox Christian world, Chechens’ inter-elite 
competition for power, Russia’s economic and geographical interests—and concludes his 
analysis with an explanation of how the question of Chechen secession became a political 
tool inside Russia’s nomenclature.136 To Hughes’s list, we would like to add two additional 
grievances: the Soviet regime’s war crimes during and after WW II and the acts of violence 
and harassment against ethnic minorities during compulsory conscription service in Soviet 
Army. Both of them are well known facts, although in our opinion underestimated as 
relevant grievances for conflict from the Chechens perspective.  
We will first give a brief overview of operation Chechevitsa (Lentil)of 1944 as an 
example to illustrate the scale, cruelty, and thoroughness of Soviet war crimes. Some 
scholars have even assessed the outcomes of operation Chechevitsa as genocidal 
deportation.137 Jeffrey Burds has studied Soviet War Crimes in the Caucasus region during 
WW II; according to Burds, officially, the Soviets accused the Chechens of cooperation in 
Wehrmacht. Although it is known that the Germans barely had any collaboration with the 
Chechens during WW II, this fact did not stop the Soviets from using that claim.138 In 
reality, the Soviets used this opportunity to launch a tactical operation in order to eliminate 
anti-Soviet resistance elements from the territory of Chechnya.  
To accomplish this task, in February 1944, a 120,000-man strong NKVD force 
launched the deportation operation in Caucasus. In the end, more than 600,000 people, 
including 400,000 Chechens, were deported, mainly to Kazakhstan. During the deportation 
process, an estimated 100,000 people died. One example of the cruelty that accompanied 
the deportations are the actions conducted in Khaibakh village: 700 people were locked in 
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a barn and burned alive.139 While the majority of ethnic Chechens were deported out of 
their motherland, at the same time, thousands of Soviet officials were imported into 
Chechnya, tasked with continuously imposing the concept of Sovietization. In practice, 
this meant that all the official positions were filled by non-ethnic Chechens. This in turn 
led to suppression of traditions, culture, and religion. Ethnic Chechens who had managed 
to avoid deportation had no legal means to rule the country or decide their own way of life. 
At the same time, their fellow countrymen in exile were living in labor camps, only allowed 
to return back home after thirteen years abroad.140 Returning home was not an easy task: 
all the property formerly owned by deported personnel had been nationalized. They had no 
fair position in society and needed to start from a scratch. One can only imagine how these 
events inflamed hate against the oppressors. The ideal of resistance against foreigners was 
not gone; rather, it was growing through the generations. 
The Soviet Union´s official policy also forced its ethnic minorities into conscription 
in the Soviet Army. In the First Chechen war, this practice would hit the Russian Federation 
like a two-edged sword: firstly, the experience of dedovshchina141gave to ethnic Chechens 
another perfect reason to hate ethnic Russians. Dale R. Herspring, in his study about the 
phenomena of “dedovshchina” in the Soviet / Russian army, describes the seriousness of 
the problem: “It has undermined combat readiness, unit cohesion and led to an increase in 
suicides and desertions by recruits who cannot stand the kind of humiliation, beatings, 
rapes and even murders they face on a daily basis.”142 Although one can argue that 
dedovshchina was an inevitable part of army service, it is probable that it created additional 
tensions between ethnic groups, and active dedovshchina in the Soviet Army likely created 
another set of Chechens who were seeking revenge. Secondly, while part of the former 
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Soviet Army system, the Chechen field commanders and soldiers had learned almost 
everything about the former Soviet Army’s capabilities. Ethnic Chechens were not only 
part of compulsory army service; some of them stayed in active duty and served in high 
ranks. The most prominent examples are air force general Dzhokhar Dudayev and artillery 
colonel Aslan Maskhadov: after the collapse of Soviet Union, both of them become 
outstanding military and political leaders for Chechnya.143 In principle, the Chechens had 
knowledge about all the Russian tactics, techniques and procedures. They knew their 
capabilities and drills. As we see in a later conflict, Chechen commanders were willing to 
use that knowhow. One can only imagine, the psychological advantage it gave to the 
Chechens and how it impacted Russian soldiers’ morale. 
Combining all these unaddressed grievances, at the collapse of Soviet Union, 
Chechens realized that this was the long-awaited “perfect storm” that would shape the 
future toward a self-determined nation-state for ethnic Chechens. As Arquilla puts it: “In 
the last three decades of the Cold War, Chechen nationalism did not die but rather waited 
its moment, like a tree in the winter waiting for spring.”144 
2. Winning the War, Losing the Future 
In November 1991, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared its 
independence.145 The Russian federation, after separating itself from the Soviet Union, 
faced uncertain times in domestic political affairs. Prudently, the administration of Russia 
did not recognize Chechen independence and initially took a soft-power approach in order 
to deal with the crisis. Russia’s initial strategies included economic blockade, the use of 
Chechen proxies, and attempts to demonize Chechens, both internally and 
internationally.146 Chechens at the same time tried to secure their fragile independence 
within international frames of law. They ran the referendum on independence in November 
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1992 and claimed international recognition.147 Arquilla describes the tensions between 
winter 1992 and summer 1994 as an obvious “road to war.”148 In December 1994, 
President Yeltsin authorized military operations in Chechnya. The official goal of the First 
Chechen war, as stated by Yeltsin, was “disarmament of illegal armed forces”149 and 
restoration of order in Chechnya.150 Russians aimed for a quick and resolute campaign. 
The overall campaign plan foresaw gaining control of Grozny and, if needed, the 
elimination of resistance in rural areas.  
Although the Soviet Army had had its recent instructive experience about irregular 
warfare in Afghanistan, its successor, the Russian Army, employed its forces and 
capabilities in the First Chechnya War using all conventional means: they tried to hold 
territories, implemented maneuver warfare, and presumed artillery success. Chechens 
answered with irregular tactics and unconventional means. Arquilla and Karasik describe 
the Chechen way of warfare as follows:  
The Chechens fought back with small, mobile teams of light, but 
nevertheless well-equipped, fighters. Instead of centralized command and 
control, the Chechens gave great latitude for action to their dispersed but 
highly interconnected bands, which fought in a nonlinear fashion, enabling 
them, repeatedly, to “swarm” advancing Russian columns from all 
directions. Finally, the Chechens engaged in military strikes in Russia, as 
well as afloat on the Black Sea. Their view of the arena of conflict was 
expansive, their organizational approach innovative, and their results 
stunning.151 
Nearly two years of violence culminated with the battle of Grozny, in which 
Russians were forced to face the fact that they were losing the war against a force ten times 
smaller. In August 1996, Chechens gained control over Grozny. Because of Chechen 
launched tactical terrorist attacks and loss of control in capital region, Russians were 
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seeking for ways to settle the conflict.152 When Russian leadership realized that they might 
lose the ongoing war with Chechens, they started to look for political solution. 
The conflict found its temporary solution in summer 1996 when former Russian 
army general Aleksandr Lebedev and Chechen representatives Maskhadov and Basayev 
agreed on a ceasefire, which established that “the final decision on the status of Chechnya 
was postponed for ‘up to’ five years.”153 The parties agreed that “Chechnya would remain 
part of a ‘common economic space’ with the Russian Federation, and Russia would provide 
funds for the reconstruction of the war ravaged infrastructure of the republic.”154 Chechens 
thus won the war on the operational level but lost the strategic battle for independence. One 
could argue that Russians lost the war in Chechnya but won a major prize: Chechnya 
launched terrorist campaign in Russia from 1996 until 1999 and the Second Chechen war 
in 1999.  
3. Political Accommodation and Russian Democracy 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, its people and 
politics, faced an enormous challenge: how to transform the state from socialism to 
capitalism, from one-party autocracy to multi-party democracy. One can only imagine the 
level of confusion, complexity, and anxiety it caused. The Russian Federation declared its 
sovereignty from the Soviet Union in June 1990; from 1917 till this declaration of 
sovereignty, Russia had been governed by the communists. In principle, for all those years, 
the state was governed by one political party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet regime exploited socialism, and the Communist Party had an exclusive control 
over political power. The heart of the Soviet political system was the Politburo. For more 
than seventy years, the Russian people and politics were controlled by handful non-
democratic politicians. With the declaration of independence and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Russian federation faced the great challenge: how to transform the state into 
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new political and economic system. Because of the previous one-party system and state-
controlled economy, democracy and free-market economy were unknown domains for 
Russians at all institutional levels. Even though the future seemed hectic for the Russian 
nation, the people stayed hopeful, and open to changes. One of the authors of this thesis 
has first-hand experience with life in the former Soviet Union: after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, people were looking to the future with open minds and hopes for a 
democratic and free future for all former Soviet nations and nation-states.  
When trying to assess the role of democracy in Russian society in 1996, we argue 
that there is considerable evidence that the overall support for reform was notable. Like 
other former Soviet nations, Russians supported the ideas of reforms and the concept of 
democracy. Moreover, these beliefs and values appeared not only in capital regions but all 
over the nations.155 Christian W. Haerpfer concludes his study about support for 
democracy in Russia 1992—2002 with following: “despite frequent pessimistic 
assumptions in the literature about the bleak future for democracy in Russia, mass public 
support for democracy as the best form of government at the level of regime principles 
encompasses a relative majority of Russian citizens. This political support for democracy 
has grown over time (1996–2000) in Russia.”156 The Russian society was open to changes 
and reforms, and not only in economic, social, and local policy domains: the society was 
willing to reflect on its attitude also concerning foreign policy and defense policy aspects. 
Democratic changes in Russian society and political system thus had direct impact on the 
outcome of the asymmetric conflict between Russians and Chechens. Although there were 
a number of variables involved, there are two main components to our argument, both 
consisting of elements of democratic development inside the Russian Federation: the 
upcoming presidential elections and development of freedom of press.  
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First, the impending election during the first Chechen war, played a crucial role in 
the outcome of this war. Russian political leadership had realized that the actual political 
authority has shifted from handful people in Politburo into hands and minds of Russian 
citizens. For the first time in Russian history, political leaders were facing the fact that the 
people had the power to decide who was going form the parliament and who was going to 
be the next president. For the first time, unsound political actions by acting government 
might mean that a domestic audience would respond inconveniently during the elections. 
The times and principles had changed: president and parliament were not appointed by the 
Politburo anymore; from now on, it was the responsibility of Russian citizens. It was a new 
and unknown concern for Russian political elite: till the 1990s it was unthinkable that 
regular citizens might have any impact on ongoing or future political decisions. Political 
leaders realized the tension in society caused by the war might have an impact on upcoming 
Presidential elections. Hughes argues that “The policy shift from a strategy of coercion to 
a strategy of political accommodation was driven by the need to find an exit from a war 
that Russia was losing, and which was harming Yeltsin’s chances of re-election in the June 
1996 presidential election.”157 Several scholars argue that there were two key components 
that led the conflict to cease-fire: overall dissatisfaction in society concerning the war 
between Russia and Chechnya and the impact that societal pressure might have on 
Presidential elections.158 As Edward W. Walker puts it: “With presidential elections 
approaching in the summer of 1996, Yeltsin apparently concluded early that spring that he 
needed to convince the Russian electorate that an end to the war in Chechnya was in 
sight.”159 With these democratically calculated considerations, the Russian-Chechen 
ceasefire was decided, at least from the Russian perspective: “Just prior to the elections, 
Yeltsin declared a unilateral cease-fire, pushed for a peace accord, and visited Chechnya 
as a gesture of conciliation.”160 The Russian leadership had legitimate concerns about how 
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people would respond their beliefs and attitudes during upcoming elections, and this 
reasonable concern impacted Russian leadership’s decision making process concerning the 
war with Chechnya. 
However, the upcoming elections were not the only element that had an impact on 
Russia’s decision to sign the peace treaty with the Chechens. The newly formed press 
system taught Russians a severe lesson in how uncensored journalism can affect 
relationships between the government and the society. During the Soviet times, the media 
was under strict and centralized party control. It was unthinkable that journalism could 
have any negative impact on the political landscape. During the Soviet time, one of the 
major tasks for journalism was to support government produced propaganda; freedom of 
press did not exist. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the press system developed in 
principle toward a free-press model. At the time of the First Chechen War, the freedom of 
press provided objective reflection of the war. Although the reflection was objective, it was 
unpleasant and unexpected for a domestic audience: the Russian people had not 
experienced objectively broadcasted horrors of warfare since WWII. In the First Chechen 
War, both sides used extreme methods in order to make a psychological impact on 
adversaries. With the help of the uncensored press, all these acts of horror become part of 
daily life for Russians. The populace started to argue over the justification and morality of 
the war, and it did not make any sense to Russians that the powerful Russian Army could 
not defeat the small and disorganized Chechen force. “From the beginning of the military 
action in Chechnya, the Russian public had been hesitant about committing to a military 
solution. The high number of casualties and military losses made this hesitancy worse.”161 
Uncensored press broadcasts reflected negative domestic support, Russian government was 
facing sequent challenge. As the Russian government was not able to justify the cause of 
the war and the Russian forces kept losing on a tactical level, the government was seeking 
ways to break the vicious circle. The possible loss of domestic political support forced the 
Russian government to shift its policy from a destruction strategy to a negotiation strategy. 
The significant role of freedom of press forced Russian leadership to find a solution for the 
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war in Chechnya; such an impact would never come under serious concern during the 
Soviet times. Freedom of press and democratic regime type therefore had an impact on the 
outcome of asymmetric war between the Russian Federation and Chechnya. 
In conclusion, we will argue that democracy as a regime type had an impact on 
outcomes of asymmetric war between the Russian Federation and Chechnya. The two main 
elements that forced Russians to shift their strategy were the upcoming presidential 
elections and the development of freedom of the press. Russian political leadership were 
impacted by possible loss of domestic electorate support; the political elite were concerned 
that, without support, they might not be re-elected to govern the Russian federation. 
As discussed in our statistical analyses, we will confirm that our third hypothesis   
– as the duration of the conflict increases, the probability of the strong democratic actor’s 
winning the war decreases much faster than non-democratic strong actor – is supported 
with historical case study from the First Chechen War. Again, the analysis results of the 
relationship between the strong winning the conflict and conflict duration is inversely 
proportional. The conflict duration is logarithmically represented. Moreover, there is an 
interaction between conflict duration and the regime type (democracy) of the strong actor: 
as the duration of a conflict grows, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the 
conflict will decrease much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Humans will continue to fight wars: as Kenneth Waltz sees it, “if one asks whether 
we can now have peace where in the past there has been war, the answers are most often 
pessimistic.”162 Therefore, it will be essential to discover and better understand what 
affects the outcomes of wars in order to win them. In our study, using logistic regression 
analysis, we have studied the effect of three independent variables—number of states 
offering external support to the non-state actor, duration of the conflict, regime type of the 
strong actor—and two control variables—GDP, and population of the country—on the 
outcome of an asymmetric conflict between a strong actor (the government) and a weak 
actor (the non-state actor). Then, based on the relationship between conflict outcome and 
the predominant system level factors, we introduced an approach for explaining the 
different conflict outcome results. Based on the system-level analysis and on the statistical 
analysis results of the independent and control variables, we concluded the following:  
First, the very substantively and statistically significant effect of the number of 
actors providing external support to weak actors (non-state actors) will decrease the 
likelihood that strong actors (governments) will win conflicts.  
Second, as the duration of the conflict grows longer, the probability of the strong 
actor winning the war will decrease.  
Third, the very substantively and statistically significant interaction between 
conflict duration and regime type of the strong actor proves that, as conflict duration 
increases, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will decrease 
much faster than for a non-democratic strong actor. 
Fourth, the very substantively and statistically significant interaction between 
conflict duration and regime type of the strong actor proves that, even if conflict duration 
increases, the likelihood of a democratic strong actor winning the conflict will still be 
higher than the likelihood of a non-democratic strong actor winning. 
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Because we are in the era of modern warfare, and because the defense communities 
are challenged with asymmetric warfare, the wider implications may be studied in future 
research. Understanding the mechanics of asymmetric warfare is essential for success in 
war. In principle, from such theoretical knowledge of asymmetric warfare, both sides can 
benefit: the relatively stronger and relatively weaker one. It might be beneficial for defense 
planners to apply our theoretical findings on top of the historical case studies and to draw 
insights for future asymmetric conflicts. 
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